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Abstract
This paper uses U.S. macroeconomic data drawn from 2001 to 2010 in order to test for
the operation of a credit channel of monetary transmission. Using a combination of a VAR and
ADL time series frameworks, evidence is found for the impairment of the credit channel during
the crisis period relative to the period which preceded it. Evidence is also found against the
presence of a "credit crunch" during the crisis, and supporting evidence is found for the existence
of a "credit trap." This analysis indicates a significant role for credit market imperfections in the
transmission of monetary policy, and holds policy implications for the potential impact of future
monetary expansions conducted in the setting of a financial crisis.

ii

I. Introduction
A problem which is central to the subject of economics, and to financial economics in
particular, is the asymmetric distribution of information. In the context of contracts or
transactions, asymmetric information can introduce frictional costs which, in aggregate, can have
a significant impact on the ways that markets function. Numerous examples of this phenomenon
have been documented, beginning most famously with the "market for lemons." Over time,
knowledge of the problems which can stem from asymmetric information has significantly
expanded – though the relative importance of such issues to the general economy largely remains
unknown.
Credit market frictions are an important example of the costs which exist as a result of
asymmetric information, and can play a significant role in determining the cost of borrowing for
firms which seek external financing. In turn, these frictions may influence the transmission of
monetary shocks – since an expansionary policy targeting lower interest rates will be expected to
impact aggregate demand primarily through borrowing and investment – creating a "credit
channel" in which monetary policy affects output in part by causing a shift in the supply of
loans.1
The recent course of monetary policy has been dramatic to say the least. In its response to
the Subprime lending crisis, the Federal Reserve first moved to lower short term interest rates –
long the traditional outlet for an expansionary monetary policy. As rates approached their lower
bound, however, and as financial markets continued to flounder, the Fed was forced to develop
new additions to its toolkit.2 One such program was a large scale expansion of the Reserve's
balance sheet – a policy which was designed to inject liquidity into the banking sector, to flatten
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the term structure of interest rates, and to stimulate both demand for and the supply of loans.3 In
light of the unprecedented nature of this program, it is no surprise that the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy – a subject which has sparked much controversy – has once again
attracted a high degree of academic attention.
The Federal Reserve's move to expand its balance sheet, a program known as
"quantitative easing," was justified by the belief that, in the short run, an unexpected shift in the
money supply will have an impact on national output. A large body of empirical research has
documented this phenomenon, but for the most part, publications of this nature have remained
conspicuously silent about the mechanism, or combination of mechanisms which might transmit
a monetary shock to the real economy. 4 It is only over the past two decades that this question has
been subjected to rigorous examination. The result has been the genesis of a number of theories
designed to explain this process – but despite the widespread attention which this topic has
received, even today there is no clear consensus regarding the exact nature of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.
Among the various explanations of this mechanism, the most widely known is that
proposed by Friedman (1970), as derived from Fisher's quantity theory of money. The
mechanism which Friedman describes is based on the assumptions that both the demand for
money and velocity of money are stable, and the prices are sticky in the short run. As Friedman
argues, if the monetary base expands – via open market operations or otherwise – those in
possession of new money will hold excess cash relative to other assets. In attempt to readjust
their portfolios to their previous allocations, these individuals will spend that excess cash,
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causing a rise in aggregate demand.5 However, while this explanation is entirely sensible, it is
also somewhat vague. Thus, a large number of more detailed transmission mechanisms have
been conceived in an attempt to expand on Friedman's work.
These are the so called "neoclassical channels," the most widely accepted of which is the
“Interest rate" or "cost" channel. Within this view, an expansion of monetary policy will lead to a
rise in the price of interest bearing assets, which necessarily implies that the yields associated
with those assets, (or interest rates), will fall. If, in turn, the demand for loanable funds is
sensitive to changes in the interest rate – also the cost of borrowing – a fall in rates will lead to
marginally greater demand for loanable funds, a greater volume of investment, and higher
national output. 6
Other explanation for the transmission of monetary policy rely on the existence of credit
market imperfections, and are popularly known as the “credit channel.” As opposed to the
neoclassical channels, this view emphasizes the fact that non-deposit sources of financing for
banks represent imperfect substitutes, that companies' balance sheets are important determinants
of the terms of borrowing, and that banks' specialized knowledge of borrowers make them the
best suited providers of financial intermediation.7
While the empirical literature demonstrates a clear role for the interest rate channel as
well as a close long run relationship between money growth and nominal GDP,8 investigation
into the nature (or even the existence) of the credit channel has yielded mixed results. A
consensus on this subject has yet to emerge, and even more controversial is whether the relative
significance of different channels of monetary transmission will remain static as real economic
5
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variables shift. This question, in particular, has been drawn into focus as a result of the recent
financial crisis. While there is a developed literature exploring changes in the transmission
mechanism over time, fewer studies have addressed the potential impairment of that mechanism
within the context of a financial crisis.
This paper seeks to address the relative importance of the credit channel during the recent
financial crisis as compared to the period which preceded it. This question is explored by
modeling the relationships between monetary policy, key macroeconomic variables, financial
indicators, and the money multiplier in VAR and ADL time series frameworks.
This study considers a wide range of variables related to the transmission of monetary
policy. These include: the money multiplier, changes to the monetary base (M0), M1, the federal
funds rate, 10 year treasury rates, current inflation, expected inflation, unemployment, the
LIBOR/OIS spread, BBB corporate bond/treasury spreads, a proxy for bank asset values and
volatility, a proxy for collateral asset values and collateral asset volatility. The data was collected
on a bi-weekly frequency, covering a period ranging from 2001 to 2011, and was drawn from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' online database, Bloomberg, and the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors.
The dependent variable used within this study was the money multiplier, which is defined
as the ratio between M1 and M0. Because movement in M1 is determined by bank lending, the
currency ratio, and changes in the monetary base, this variable may be used to isolate the effects
of movement in M0 on bank lending – so long as the other determinants of M1 are controlled for.
As the credit view predicts, an expansion of M0 will lead to a rise in both bank lending and M1,
independent of a change in interest rates. Thus, if there is a credit channel of monetary
transmission – and given an adjustment lag – movement in M0 should have no impact on the

4

money multiplier. The empirical portion of this investigation tests for this result, however, it
must also be acknowledged that it is possible for M0 to have no predictive power over the
multiplier even in the absence of a credit channel. This result might be found, for instance, if
bank lending expanded for unrelated reasons during a period of monetary expansion – or,
conversely, if lending coincidentally declined during a monetary contraction.
Based on a combination of Granger causality tests, VAR impulse responses and time
series analysis, I find that innovations in M0 are not a significant predictor of change in the
money multiplier over the period ranging from December, 2001 to August, 2007. This is
consistent with the existence of a functional credit channel during this time. Conversely, I find
that the monetary base was a significant predictor of changes in the money multiplier during the
period ranging from August, 2007 to December, 2010. This shift relative to the period preceding
it is consistent with the credit channel of monetary transmission being impaired during the recent
financial crisis.
Findings for the relationship between bank capital and movement in the multiplier cast
doubt on the hypothesis that a "capital crunch" was responsible for this impairment. Returns to
the W5000 index, however, are found to positively relate to movement in the multiplier for both
the crisis and pre-crisis periods. This result supports the hypothesis that a "credit trap" may have
manifested during the crisis.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the
money multiplier and the recent trends in its components. Section III develops the distinction
between the credit channel and neoclassical transmission mechanisms, and Section IV explores
the theories of credit channel impairment. Section V discusses the background of the subprime
mortgage crisis. Section VI describes the data set, followed by descriptions of the study's

5

methodology in section VII, and results in section VIII. Section IX concludes, and poses
questions for further research.

II. The Money Multiplier
The primary dependent variable used within this investigation is that of the "money
multiplier." In light of this paper's focus on the transmission of monetary policy via the credit
channel, use of the money multiplier as a dependent variable, (as opposed to bank loans, for
example), may at first seem somewhat surprising. The basis for this choice then merits further
explanation, and is addressed within this section. I begin by defining the money multiplier,
discussing the roles of the "currency" and "excess reserve" ratios, and describe the trends in each
of these factors over the course of recent history.

A. Definition
The money multiplier is a conceptual representation of the fact that, depending on one's
definition, there may be a great deal more "money" circulating in the economy than there is
currency. To the layman, this statement may seem an odd one; money as it is popularly
conceived of consists purely of coins and paper, which can of course be physically be counted.
Economists, however, define money not simply as currency, but based on its primary role and
function – to serve as a medium of exchange. Because cash is not always used for this purpose –
the lion's share of payments being made by check – the question of "what constitutes money?" is
a surprisingly difficult one to answer.9 Of course, some components of money, (such as
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currency), are fairly easy to identify. But if checks are used for payments, shouldn't checking
account balances be included as "money" too? And what of savings accounts which will transfer
funds automatically to checking accounts should the account holder write a check? Clearly, an
argument could be made for a definition of money which includes both of these; however,
another problem arises when expanding the definition of money – choosing when to stop.
Unfortunately, there is no clear demarcation between money and its close substitutes.10 As a
result of this fact, the U.S. government has several official definitions of the money supply, three
of which are explored below.
The most obvious definition of money includes only the coins and paper money which
exchange hands in our economy. Following intuition, then, this is the conceptual basis for the
U.S. government's narrowest definition of money – "MB" or the "monetary base." The second
definition of money, "M0" also includes coins and paper money, but expands to encompass
commercial banks' reserves with the central bank as well, since deposits of this nature
hypothetically also consist of currency (or an even more liquid digital equivalent). Movement in
M0 is directly controlled by the policies of the Federal Reserve, whose open-market operations –
the sale and purchase of assets – either give banks more reserves or take reserves away.11 The
trend in M0 over the course of recent history has been consistently upward, though much more
variation has appeared in this series over the course of the past few years. This can be seen in
Figure 1, which depicts the level of M0 over time.
A third definition of money is that of "M1." As compared to M0, M1 consists of coins
and paper money held outside the vaults of depository institutions, traveler's checks,
conventional checking accounts, and certain other checkable deposits in banks and savings
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institutions.12 Though M1 does not include commercial banks' deposits with the Federal Reserve,
the level of M1 has typically been greater than that of M0. Similar to M0, the level of M1 has
consistently risen over time, as is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: M0 and M1 over time
M0 and M1 (Billions of Dollars)
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The difference between M0 and M1 is a result of the system of "fractional reserve
banking" in which banks accept deposits, retain a fraction of those funds, and lend away the
balance. Consider an economy in which banks retain all of depositors' funds. In this case, M1
will equal the total sum of currency, and M0 and M1 will be equivalent. Within a fractional
reserve system, however, banks may choose to keep only a portion of their total deposits, lending
out the difference. If banks do choose to lend, a greater quantity of coin and paper money will
circulate outside of vaults while the total value of initial deposits still remains the same. Based
on the definition of M1, then, banks have the power to create more M1 money by lending. This
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is the central concept of the money multiplier, which states that for a change in the monetary
base – and holding all else equal – the resulting impact on M1 will be the product of a scalar.
A natural question which arises in light of this phenomenon is: exactly how much more
M1 money will exist than there is currency? Or in other words, what will be the level of the
money multiplier? The answer to question is "it depends." Since bankers are free to choose how
much to hold in reserve – either deposited with the central bank or otherwise – all of the factors
which influence bank behavior will play a role in determining the multiplier. But while it may be
difficult to predict the multiplier precisely, by making simplifying assumptions, it is possible to
find some clues. If we assume that lending is profitable and that banks are profit maximizers, we
can predict that banks will lend as much as they are able to. Two factors will restrain lending
behavior. First, banks must retain sufficient reserves to meet the needs of depositors should they
demand their money.13 Next, they must meet Federally dictated reserve requirements.
In the special case that banks lend until constrained by reserve requirements, the money
multiplier can be explicitly calculated. In this case, an expansion of bank reserves implies that
banks will hold excess reserves beyond what is required by regulation. Those funds will be used
for new loans, and (as seems likely) the recipients of those funds will deposit them with a bank.
A fraction of these new deposits will be held in reserve per the requirement, and the difference
will once again be loaned away. The chain of deposit/loan creation will only end when there are
no more excess reserves for banks to loan, suggesting that the total change in the M1 money
supply affected by an expansion of reserves will be the sum of a geometric series. If this is the
case, the theoretical money multiplier will be the reciprocal of the reserve requirement "r":
1
∆1  ∆0
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This formula, of course, constitutes a gross simplification of real world conditions. As
previously mentioned, the reserve ratio which banks ultimately choose to adhere to will be a
function of the variables which affect bank lending. Among these are monetary policy and all the
rest of the real economic variables which play a role in determining output. However, if these
variables are controlled for, movement in the money multiplier (all else equal) will reflect
changes in aggregate lending.14 It is this argument which justifies use of the multiplier as this
investigation's primary dependent variable.
It is also important to note that the above formula for the money multiplier can be
reorganized as follows:


  

1 ∆1

 ∆0

As such, the multiplier can be measured at any point in time as the ratio between M1 and
M0. I refer to measurements of the multiplier calculated in this way as the "realized" or
"empirical" money multiplier – which has trended downwards over the course of recent history.15
This variable is plotted over time in Figure 2, which depicts both a general downward trend in
the multiplier as well as a dramatic decline which occurred over the course of the recent financial
crisis. While intuition dictates that a relationship of some kind likely exists between the crisis
and this contraction, there are several theories as to what explicitly might have happened.
Because a similar decline in the money multiplier occurred over the course of the Great
Depression, a review of data from this period may inform investigation of the recent crisis. As
can be seen in Figure 3, reproduced from Friedman and Schwartz (1963), the monetary base
expanded over the course of the Depression while the "money stock" declined.16

14
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In considering what caused either collapse, it is useful to recall that the multiplier
functions through a cycle of loan and deposit creation. This implies two potential complications
which might lead to a breakdown in the multiplier: A) individuals or borrowers may choose not
to deposit currency, or B) banks may be either unable or choose not to issue new loans.

Figure 2: The money multiplier, 1984-2010
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Figure 3: The stock of money, 1929-1933
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B. The Currency Ratio
Until now, this discussion of the multiplier has assumed that, as banks create new loans,
the recipients of those loans will in turn create new deposits – or, in other words, that individuals
will always choose to deposit money instead of holding currency. This, of course, is not always
the case. In reality, the fraction of money which individuals choose to hold as currency, (versus
deposit), is also a variable factor. In aggregate, this is the fraction of M1 which consists of
currency, or the "currency ratio" – movement in which can have a large impact on the level of
the money multiplier. If, for example, firms and households choose to hold all of their money as
currency, (currency ratio = 1), banks will hold no deposits and the money multiplier will equal
one. By contrast, if the currency ratio is equal to zero, the level of M1 will be a function of the
average reserve ratio adopted by banks in aggregate– as will be the money multiplier.
Unsurprisingly, the observed currency ratio falls somewhere between these two extremes. In
addition, and significantly, the currency ratio need not be static. Thus, if the currency ratio were
to shift closer towards a value of one, this would lead to a decline in the money multiplier.
In the case of the Great Depression, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) find evidence that the
currency ratio did in fact rise. Figure 4 is reproduced from Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and
depicts the money stock, currency, and commercial bank deposits over the period of 1929 to
March, 1933. Here, it can be seen that as the money stock, demand deposits, and time deposits
fell, currency held by the public increased. This indicates that the collapse in the multiplier
which occurred during the Depression can be attributed, at least in part, to a rise in the currency
ratio. This story is consistent with Figure 9, which shows the growth rate of the deposit-currency
ratio from 1919-1941 and can be found in the Appendix. As can be seen for the early 1930's,
growth of this ratio was largely negative.

12

Figure 4: Money stock, currency and commercial bank deposits

Data from the recent crisis, however, does not indicate a large role for growth in the
currency ratio in explaining recent declines in the multiplier. Figure 5 plots the currency ratio
over time. As can be seen, the currency ratio was largely stable over course of recent years.
Given that this is the case, this factor is assumed to be constant within the estimated model.

Figure 5: Currency ratio over time
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C. Excess Reserves
As in the case of a change in the currency ratio, shifts in loan supply or loan demand can
also lead to movement in the multiplier. If banks either are unable or choose not to lend
deposited funds, this will result in both a decline in the money multiplier and a rise in the excess
reserves held by banks. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) find evidence that, in addition to a rise in
the currency ratio, the quantity of loans (denominated in dollars) relative to deposits declined
during the Great Depression. In their study, bank lending is not addressed in terms of excess
reserves, but rather through the lens of the deposit-reserve ratio. Figure 6, also reproduced from
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), depicts the downward trend which occurred in the depositreserve ratio over the period of the Depression. As it indicates, banks issued fewer loans for each
dollar of deposits that they held. Together with the rise of the currency ratio, this phenomenon
may explain the Great Depression era collapse of the money multiplier. However, and while this
finding is certainly useful, it is also important to note that this analysis fails to distinguish
between a fall in loan supply versus a fall in loan demand – either of which could have produced
a trend along these lines in the deposit-reserve ratio.

Figure 6: Determinants of the stock of money
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Data from recent years show that a similar phenomenon occurred over the course of the
Subprime crisis. Figure 7 plots banks' excess reserves with the Federal Reserve over time, and
shows that, whereas banks typically minimized their holdings of excess reserves in the years
preceding the crisis, the series shows a sharp upward spike beginning in 2008.
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This implies that lending was in some way impeded during this period, in turn leading to
a fall in the money multiplier. As mentioned previously, there are two explanations for a decline
in lending of this nature. The first is a contraction of the loan supply. Alternatively, this trend
might also be explained by a fall in loan demand. The process of distinguishing between these is
discussed further in sections IV and V, each of which explores the relationship between
monetary policy and the multiplier.
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III. The Channels of Monetary Transmission
A. Neoclassical Channels
Broadly speaking, the transmission mechanisms of monetary can be divided into two
inclusive categories: those stemming from a neoclassical framework, or "neoclassical channels,"
and those which are based in credit market imperfections. These are aptly named the "nonneoclassical channels." The former category is derived from the neoclassical models of
investment put forth by Jorgenson (1963) and Tobin (1969), the income models of consumption
postulated by Brumberg and Modigiliani (1954), Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Friedman
(1957), and the Mundell-Flemming IS/LM model.17
As one of the greatest proponents of Monetary economics, the works of Milton Friedman
have greatly influenced economic thought concerning the relationship between change in the
money supply and output. Friedman (1970) describes the transmission of change in monetary
growth to income and spending in terms of stable demand for money, and through Fisher's
quantity theory of money (MV = PT). As opposed to the Keynesian view, Friedman asserts that
the velocity of money is fairly stable and that, because prices are sticky, movement in the money
supply can impact total output. The transmission mechanism which Friedman proposes falls
along these lines: first, growth in the monetary base – whether produced via open market
operations or otherwise – will raise the cash holdings of firms and households relative to their
other assets. If those individuals have consistent wealth allocation preferences, this implies that
they now hold excess cash, and will try to adjust their portfolios by buying other assets. Of
course, one individual's spending is another's income, implying that those selling assets will now
hold excess cash, and as a result will seek to adjust their portfolios...and so on. While all people
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together cannot change the amount of cash that all hold, each individual will attempt to do so on
a personal basis – causing a rise in asset value that spreads from asset to asset. Cumulatively, the
introduction of excess cash into the portfolios of certain individuals will lead to a rise in
Aggregate Demand (AD), and (given sticky prices) subsequently to a rise in output.18
While entirely sensible, Friedman's hypothesized AD transmission mechanism provides
only a vague explanation for the path that new money will follow as it diffuses from the cash
accounts of balance sheets to its final impact on output. As a result, an abundance of theories
have been penned seeking to describe the relationship between monetary variables and
components of national output more specifically – and as based on classical economic classical
economic theory. These are the "neoclassical" channels, a semi-exhaustive list of which can be
found below. These include the:
I.

II.

III.

IV.

18

Interest Rate Channel: the direct interest rate or "cost" channel involves the impact
of interest rates on the cost of capital, and therefore on business and household
investment decisions. Should general short term interest rates rise, so too will
individual firms' and households' cost of capital, leading to a decline in aggregate
investment. Because a monetary expansion will lead to a rise in the value of interest
bearing assets, so too will that expansion be linked to the level of interest rates.
Inflation expectations channel: Boivin et al. (2010) finds that a shift in monetary
policy may (at times) credibly signal the Federal Reserve's commitment to pursue a
specific policy over the course of an extended period of time. If this is the case, that
signal will reduce (raise) inflation expectations and therefore have an impact on the
level of real interest rates. This, in turn, will lead to a contraction (expansion) of
investment, and overall aggregate economic activity.
"Consumer wealth" or "consumption" channel: an expansionary (contractionary)
monetary policy will have the effect of increasing (decreasing) the average value of
interest bearing assets. Higher (lower) levels of wealth will then lead to greater
(reduced) levels of consumption.
Export stimulus channel: A monetary shock may, as previously described, have an
impact on inflation expectations. If such a shift occurs, it will be reflected in
international exchange rates. An expansionary (contractionary) shock will then lead

Friedman (1970).
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V.

VI.

VII.

to a devaluation (appreciation) of the currency, and subsequently to marginally more
(less) competitive pricing for exports.
Term structure channel: If movement in the federal funds rate signals a long term
policy commitment to financial markets, the term structure of interest rates will adjust
to reflect this fact. If the policy commitment conveyed is expansionary
(contractionary) long term rates will fall (rise), leading to an expansion (contraction)
in those segments of investment which are sensitive to changes in long term interest
rates.
Tax burden channel: because changes to the federal funds rate are enacted through
the sale or purchase of government securities, changes in policy will have the effect
of either reducing or expanding the interest expense which the Federal government
will eventually have to repay. Thus, an expansionary policy will reduce the
government's expected future interest expense, lower the expected future tax burden
for citizens, and lead to higher levels of consumption.
Tobin's q channel: If monetary policy is eased and interest rates are lowered,
demand for stocks will increase and stock prices rise. For firms whose equity will
then be in greater demand, the cost of capital will have fallen, thereby leading to
increased investment spending and a rise in aggregate demand.19
While these channels are not the focus of this investigation per se, a motivating factor for

research on the credit channel is that empirical studies of aggregate spending have failed to
identify a quantitatively important effect of the cost of capital variable.20 That is, the neoclassical
explanation of monetary transmission fails to fully describe the impact of monetary shocks on
aggregate output – and further, several of the puzzles which the neoclassical view cannot explain
seem to hint at the potential importance of a credit channel.
First among these is the so called magnitude puzzle of monetary policy. More
specifically, and as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) finds, the real economy is powerfully affected
by monetary policy changes which induce relatively small movements in open-market interest
rates. Simultaneously, and as previously mentioned, empirical studies have typically not found
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commensurately strong relationships between the cost-of-capital and various components of
private spending.21
Another issue stems from the timing of policy effects. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) find
that the interest rate spike associated with an unanticipated monetary tightening is largely
transitory in nature. According to their analysis, the federal funds rate will have virtually
reverted back to trend after eight to nine months following the shock, as shown by Figure 8.

Figure 8. Responses of Output, Prices and federal funds Rate to a
Monetary Policy Shock.

Reproduced from Bernanke & Gertler (1995).

However, reactions in the various components of spending which are associated with this
shock do not, for some, begin to appear until after much of the interest-rate effect has passed.
This puzzle in particular provides evidence for the potential impact of a supply shock to credit,
since we would expect a demand shock to dissipate quickly with the normalization of interest
rates.
21
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A final issue is the composition puzzle. More specifically, while monetary policy has its
most direct effects on short-term rates, the most rapid and strongest (in percentage terms) effect
of a monetary shock is on residential investment. This is puzzling because residential
investments are longer lived, and should therefore be sensitive to long-term real interest rates,
not short term. Rather than residential investment, we would have expected that the most
significant impact of a monetary shock would arise through spending on assets with shorter lives,
such as inventories and consumer durables.22

B. The credit channel:
B.i Overview of the channel
As previously described, credit market imperfections sometimes interfere with the
smooth functioning of financial markets. For firms, this will introduce a wedge between the cost
of internal funds and that of external finance – which Bernanke and Gertler (1995) describes as
the external finance premium (EFP). This premium is a reflection of deadweight costs associated
with principal agent problems, and can be formulated as follows:
    
If a monetary shock has the effect of either expanding or reducing the size of the external
finance premium, a credit channel will then exist in which credit market imperfections have a
direct influence on the impact of monetary policy. More specifically, and in the event of a
monetary shock which leads to a shift the EFP, lending and M1 will respond to movement in M0
in a way which cannot solely be attributed to a change in the level of interest rates. According to
the credit view, a change in monetary policy which lowers or raises the level of interest rates will
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tend to change the EFP in the same direction.23 Thus, controlling for movement in interest rates,
a change in M0 will be expected to have no impact on the level of the money multiplier, (given
an adjustment lag in which a change in lending can occur). By contrast, if a monetary shock does
not affect the EFP – or if the credit view does not hold – then the only adjustment which will
occur in M1 via lending will be the result of a shift in the general level of interest rates. If this is
the case, and if movement of interest rates are controlled for, the expected relationship between
change in M0 and the money multiplier will be strictly negative. But why, as the credit view
holds, should the policy of the central bank have an effect on the external finance premiums of
private credit markets? In this section I describe two possible linkages, the "balance sheet
channel" and the "lending channel."24

B.ii The balance sheet channel
The balance sheet channel arises from the problems of asymmetric information
which occur between banks and potential borrowers. Here, banks must take steps to
ensure that, once a loan has been issued, firms employ that capital in a way which is
consistent with the interests of the bank. The potential conflict of interests is mitigated
through mechanisms such as monitoring (the cost of which will be passed on to
borrowers through the external finance premium), contracts, and the use of firms' assets
as collateral. This final method, collateralization, is especially significant in that firms
which boast a stronger balance sheet will be in a better position to reduce the potential
conflict of interest – either by co-financing a greater share of a hypothetical investment,
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or by offering additional collateral to guarantee their liabilities.25 If monetary policy
impacts the state of potential borrowers' balance sheets, monetary shocks will then be
directly linked to the level of the external finance premium.26
Monetary policy may influence firms' and households' balance sheets in a
number of ways. First, and to the extent that borrowers have outstanding short-term or
floating-rate debt, a rise in short term interest rates will directly lead to a rise of interest
expenses. Because many firms rely heavily on short-term debt in order to finance both
inventories and working capital, this effect can be potentially quite significant.27 Next, a
contractionary monetary policy will lead to an aggregate decline in the value of both
interest bearing and overall assets. This decline will weaken the potential borrower's
collateral position – leading to higher costs of capital for those firms which must use
collateral in order to mitigate asymmetric information.
A monetary shock may also impact balance sheets indirectly. For companies which
market their goods to other firms, if a monetary tightening leads to reduced spending by
customers (for either cost-of-capital or balance sheet reasons), revenues will decline while fixed
and quasi-fixed costs (such as interest and wages) will not adjust in the short run. 28 The resulting
difference between the firm's uses of cash and cash inflows will then erode the firm's net worth
and creditworthiness over time.29
Of course, the balance sheet channel need not function solely in the context of
contractionary monetary policy. As Benmelech and Bergman (2009) notes, "by injecting
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liquidity into the banking sector, monetary policy [may] shift banks’ lending calculus as they
know that increased aggregate lending will influence collateral values."
Importantly, this view implies that firms which depend on banks for external finance will
be disproportionately affected by the course of monetary policy. Dependence on bank financing
may occur if the costs of accessing public credit markets – including fees associated with the
provision of audited financial information, and/or intangible costs incurred through the
divulgence of key business model details – are prohibitively expensive. For borrowers which are
unable to meet these costs, (primarily of smaller firms), the impact of monetary policy via a
balance sheet channel will be especially pronounced.30
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) investigate the balance sheet channel on the basis of this
implication. Because the balance sheet channel view predicts a disproportionate effect of
monetary policy for small firms versus large, Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) compares the
relationship between internal funds and investment decisions for large and small manufacturers.
As they find, the link between internal funds and investment does become closer following a
monetary contraction for small firms, but does not for larger firms. This finding supports the
existence of a broad credit channel; however, during episodes of monetary easing, Oliner and
Rudebusch are unable to identify any significant change in the link between liquidity and
investment from that prevailing at other times.31
The asymmetry of results found by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) for periods of tight
money versus easy money is consistent with the theoretical work describing the balance sheet
channel (see, for example, Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and
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Stiglitz (1992)). As these works indicate, firms' and households' balance sheets will affect their
ability to borrow primarily when their net worth is low. When firms or households seek external
finance for an investment at other times, balance sheet considerations will become secondary.
This theoretical argument does, however, indicate that the balance sheet channel may play a
significant role during some periods of expansionary policy – if balance sheets are particularly
weak. Thus, the balance sheet channel may have functioned throughout the episode of the
Subprime crisis – in which the strength of balance sheets generally declined and monetary policy
was expansionary.32
Cumulatively, the balance sheet channel implies an expected relationship between M0
and the money multiplier. If monetary policy is negatively related to the EFP – as predicted by
this view – then an expansion of M0 will lead to a decline in the EFP, a rise in both the demand
for loans and M1, and ultimately to a static money multiplier.

B.iii The bank lending channel
Monetary policy may also be linked to the external finance premium via a "bank lending
channel." This view holds that, because monetary policy will either increase or decrease bank
reserves, monetary shocks will shift the supply of bank loans.33 Because "bank dependent"
borrowers will not be literally shut off from other forms of credit, movement in the supply of
bank loans will have an impact on the EFP. In the case of a contractionary shock which disrupts
the supply of loans, for example, borrowers face high costs in locating a new lender. In fact, the
information that banks have about their customers may be critical to the borrower's ability to
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obtain loans. If a bank is unable to lend to a firm as a result of a monetary shock, other lenders –
who do not possess the same information – must charge that firm a higher rate of interest. In
extreme cases, firms which are unable to borrow from long term partner banks may be unable to
find any new source of financing.34 This indicates that contractionary monetary innovations will
cause the EFP to rise.
In the case of an expansionary policy, the story is symmetrical. Because the expansionary
policy will increase bank reserves, the quantity of bank loans available will shift outwards.
Banks will issue more loans to borrowers with whom they have established a relationship,
leading to a fall in the aggregate EFP. In turn, borrowing will increase – causing aggregate
investment, consumer spending, and national output to rise. This implies that, as in the case of
the balance sheet channel, bank dependent firms will be disproportionately impacted by a change
in monetary policy.
It is important to note that the bank lending channel is intrinsically linked to the balance
sheet channel. For example, if a Federal Reserve policy affects an increase in bank lending, that
policy will in turn impact firms' and households' balance sheets. This will occur because the
value of a firm's assets is determined, at least in part, by the liquidity of industry peers.35 This
implies, in turn, that with an injection of liquidity, the average value of firms' asset will rise to
allow for greater collateralization of loans and even greater availability of credit. To see this,
consider the value of capital which can be used only in the context of a single given industry.
Because that capital cannot be efficiently employed elsewhere, if firms within that industry face
a period of reduced liquidity, the value of that asset will decline and the firm which owns it will
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have reduced access to credit owing to collateral considerations. If, however, liquidity is
reintroduced into the market – in this case the group of firms which constitute our hypothetical
industry – then both the value of that asset and the availability of credit will rise.
Because the bank lending and balance sheet channels are complimentary, the relationship
between M0 and the multiplier which is implied by the lending channel also must be negative.
Thus, if the credit view holds in general, an expansion of M0 will lead to a decline in the EFP, a
rise in both the demand for and supply of loans followed by an expansion in M1, and finally to a
static money multiplier. However, and as has been previously mentioned, even should evidence
for the existence of a neutral relationship between M0 and the multiplier be found, this will not
prove that the credit channel exists. The same relationship may be found if movement in M0
coincides with changes in lending for purely coincidental reasons, or if both variables are
predicted by a third.

B.iv Building blocks of the lending channel
In order for the lending channel to operate, certain conditions must hold. Cumulatively,
these can be described as the building blocks of the lending channel.36 The most obvious of these
is that prices be sticky in the short run. After all, if prices were to adjust to a monetary shock
without a lag, any increase in the level of investment resulting from that shock would exist
purely in nominal terms. The rigidity of short term prices is a theory which has been met with
widespread acceptance within the economic community, and as such, has been the subject of
relatively little empirical investigation. One study which does seek to explore this issue is
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Kashyap (1995), which examines the frequency of changes in nominal prices. This study finds
that, for a wide range of goods which are sold at relatively high volumes, prices change relatively
infrequently – which is consistent with short term price rigidity. Other conditions which are
necessary for the existence of a credit channel are more subtle, and more controversial in nature.
One such requirement is that, for at least some firms, security issuance and bank loans
must not be viewed as perfect substitutes as sources of funding. This assumption, which has
developed a significant literature in its own right, may be more intuitive than it at first appears to
be. 37 Small businesses, for example, may depend on banks for funding as a result of their higher
costs of monitoring – and because, for firms of this nature, the costs of accessing public credit
markets will be prohibitively expensive. A company need not be small, however, in order to
depend on banks for financing. If a company's business model is such that its details cannot be
publicly disclosed, the cost of monitoring that firm will be much greater for individual investors
than for a single intermediary. If all firms had equal access to both bank loans and public credit
markets – or if the EFP did not exist, in other words – there could be no difference in cost
between public and private debt. Firms seeking to attract external funds would always choose the
cheapest source of financing – be it public debt, private, or otherwise – which would have the
effect of arbitraging away any price difference between the various sources of funding. As such,
the availability of credit would not depend on monetary policy; rather, in this case the level of
aggregate investment will be influenced by monetary shocks only through the market level of
interest rates, and as a result of the impact of wealth creation.
Diamond (1984) provides some evidence that this is not the case, developing a
theoretical framework in which financial intermediaries represent efficient vehicles for
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minimizing the costs of monitoring certain types of borrowers – a finding which implies that, for
those borrowers, public debt will be an imperfect substitute for bank loans.38 In addition to
theoretical work, a number of empirical studies support the notion that bank loans are somehow
"special." Among these, Fama (1985) and James (1987) show that the cost of reserve
requirements initially borne by banks are ultimately passed on to borrower. This finding
indicates that, since borrowers are willing to bear these costs, bank loans perform some service
for borrowers which other sources of funding do not.39
A final condition for the lending channel to function is that, as a whole, the intermediary
sector must not be able to completely insulate its lending activities from the effects of a monetary
shock to reserves. That is, in the event of a contractionary shock, banks must be unable to offset
the change in transaction deposits by either switching from deposits to less reserve-intensive
sources of financing, or by paring their net holdings of bonds.40 For an expansionary shock, the
story is symmetrical. Thus, and if this is true, adjustment to banks' balance sheets following a
monetary shock will occur at least in part via a change in loans. In aggregate, this will constitute
a shift in the aggregate supply of loans, and will have important real consequences on both
investment and on output.
This condition may also be couched in terms of banks' portfolio preferences. As Kashyap
and Stein (1994) discusses, at any given point a bank faces the possibility of random depositor
withdrawals. Because liquidating loans on short notice in order to meet depositor demand can be
very costly, banks tend to hold a portion of their assets in easily marketable securities – such as
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T-bills.41 What this implies in turn is that banks are not indifferent between asset compositions –
or in other words, that each bank has an ideal portfolio composition which dictates its asset
allocation, and which depends on that bank's circumstances. If this is the case, and in the event of
a monetary shock which either reduces or expands a bank's reservable deposits, we would expect
that bank to adhere to its preferred portfolio compositions as best as it is able – and to the extent
that those preferences remain constant. It then follows that monetary policy will have an impact
on the availability of loans.42
While each precondition for the existence of a lending channel may be challenged in its
own right, the overall academic landscape – consisting of both theoretical and empirical findings
– seems to support their cumulative plausibility. Further empirical evidence for and against the
existence of the credit channel is discussed more extensively below.

B.v Previous research
As previously mentioned, one implication of the credit channel is a disproportionate
effect of monetary policy on smaller firm – thus, a large number of cross-sectional studies have
been conducted in order to test for such a trend. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) is typical of these,
and employs quarterly time series of inventory, sales, and short-term debt data available for
manufacturing firms to find that a differential impact to monetary policy is in fact felt between
small and large manufacturers. Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) and Iacoviello & Minetti (2007)
employ a similar methodology, examining manufacturing data and data from housing markets
within the EMU respectively. Both find a significant role for the credit channel. Kashyap et al.
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(1992) comes to a similar conclusion – using firm-level inventory data for firms which do and do
not have bond ratings, and finding that inventory movements for firms which do not have bond
ratings are much more dependent on credit conditions than are those for larger firms'.
Kashyap and Stein (1995) further pursues a cross sectional approach to the investigation
of the credit channel by disaggregating data on bank balance sheets between small and large
banks. The premise of the study is that, because smaller banks are more likely to have difficulty
substituting from reservable deposits to non-deposit sources of funding, monetary shocks should
have a differential impact on the lending behavior of large versus smaller banks. Kashyap and
Stein (1995) finds evidence that this is the case – within their study, smaller banks were less able
to insulate their lending activities from the impact of a monetary shock.
So too have VAR frameworks frequently been applied to the investigation of the credit
channel. One such study is Bernanke and Blinder (1992), which finds via a VAR framework that
loans decline (with a lag) following a tightening of monetary policy – supporting the existence of
a credit channel. Similarly, Bayoumi and Darius (2011) finds that direct measures of credit
conditions anticipate future movement in asset prices, indicating that credit supply drives other
financial variables (rather than responding to them) and supporting the potential importance of
the lending channel. Despite the apparent strength of these conclusions, and as is noted by critics
of the credit view, these approaches fail to disentangle the reduction in loan demand from a
reduction in loan supply – and thus may be viewed as only weak evidence for the existence of
the lending channel.43
Evidence which explicitly conflicts with the existence of a lending channel can be found
in Romer and Romer (1990), which examines changes in the money supply and bank lending
during the Volcker disinflation. In this case, Romer and Romer find that data from this period do
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not support a causal relationship between financial variables and real output. They argue that this
may be due to a breakdown in the conditions necessary for the existence of a lending channel –
or, more specifically, that "because reserve requirements on certificates of deposit are low, banks
can obtain [non-deposit] funds with little cost in terms of reserve holdings." In turn, this
argument is challenged by Kashyap and Stein (1993, 1994), which asserts that federal subsidies
to deposit financing (via federal deposit insurance) make CDs and other forms of less-reserve
intensive funding inferior substitutes to deposits. Another study of note is Carpenter and
Demiralp (2010), which investigates the lending channel specifically in terms of the money
multiplier. As Carpenter and Demiralp find, the level of reserve balances (defined as balances
deposited by commercial banks with the Federal Reserve) cannot be causally linked to change in
the level of deposits. This is inconsistent with the money multiplier story, and is taken as
evidence against the existence of a credit channel. However, this study may be flawed in that
banks' deposits with the Federal Reserve are taken as an indicator of bank reserves in general –
which need not be the case.
Findings regarding the balance sheet channel have been much less controversial.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) typifies work investigating the balance sheet channel, and
demonstrates that its existence can help resolve a number of inconsistencies between the
neoclassical explanation of monetary transmission and the data.
Because empirical research tends to support the existence of both the balance sheet and
lending channels, this investigation operates under the assumption that both may play a
significant role in the transmission of monetary policy. That said, it is important to note that,
though the credit channel of monetary transmission may exist, so too could it at times become
impaired – or even break down entirely. In the event that evidence against the operation of the

31

credit channel is brought to bear, it is then pertinent to explore the potential reasons why, within
this study's particular data set, that channel may not have functioned.

V. Theories of Credit Channel Impairment
As has been a general theme of this paper, if either banks' lending behavior or the
creditworthiness of potential borrowers is affected by an exogenous event, this may lead to
important real consequences for aggregate investment and the economy. The question which this
section explores is: if a separate event has such an impact and precedes a monetary shock, will
the transmission of that shock be significantly altered relative to other or "normal" times? I argue
that a financial crisis constitutes such an event, and that as a result, it is reasonable to expect that
the transmission of monetary policy throughout the recent financial crisis differed significantly
from the period which preceded it. The theory that financial crisis will impact the functionality of
credit markets is largely intuitive or even obvious; however, because credit markets are complex,
the attempts to restate this theory in more rigorous terms have been prolific. The most important
or widely known of these are explored in detail below. Though these theories differ significantly
in their formulation, they do not necessarily compete.

A. "Capital crunches" – deleveraging and the threat of depositor discipline:
One theory for the impairment of credit markets stems from the history of the Great
Depression – and is based in the costs imposed by principal agent problems between bankers and
their creditors. Because of issues of asymmetric information, (as formalized by Diamond, 1984,
and discussed earlier within this paper), banks face strong incentives to offer extremely short
32

term (typically demandable) low risk debt.44 More specifically, banks will tend to segment their
risk such that it is highly concentrated in the equity and debt holdings of insiders. When adopted,
this segmentation serves to insulate depositors from the risk of loans whose quality they will be
unable to evaluate without enduring significant costs. In effect, banks must offer low-risk debt
because such debt protects depositors from inappropriate bank behavior. 45
As a result of this finding, the principal agent problem between banks and depositors
holds strong implications for the ways in which banks are likely to respond to shocks. For
example, if a bank experiences unexpected loan losses, the riskiness of bank debt will
consequently rise. Depositors who were previously content with the expected return/risk (or
Sharpe) ratio of their deposits will then react in one of two ways: A) by demanding a higher
return to their deposits, or B) by withdrawing their deposits and placing them into other banks
which they perceive to be more safe.46 In this scenario, banks will face strong incentives to lower
depositor risk; however, the only practical means of accomplishing this will be either through the
issuance of new equity in order to raise capital, or by liquidating some portion of the bank's
portfolio of risky assets.47
Of course, in the context of an economic downturn, both of these options are potentially
very costly. The issuance of new equity may entail significant costs as a result of the problem of
adverse selection (lemons problem) inherent to the issuance of equity – costs which will be
grossly exaggerated during a period in which the relative extent of bank loan losses is largely an
unknown factor. In other words, potential investors will face high costs in distinguishing good
44
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from bad bank loan portfolios, and will pass those costs along when purchasing the new equity
of banks which choose to issue.48 Further, Kashyap and Stein (1995) shows that smaller banks
have a marginally poorer ability to attract marginal sources of funding. Thus, the costs of issuing
equity will be disproportionately higher for small banks. Significantly, small banks are those
which primarily broker in loans to smaller businesses.
So too will the sale of risky assets entail significant costs. If many banks simultaneously
liquidate loans, the effect may be to flood the market for risky assets and lead to fire-sale prices.
In addition, such a reaction have the potential effect of placing borrowers into financial distress.
Both effects, if realized, will diminish the value of unsold bank assets and further deplete bank
capital. Finally, and because banks build valuable customer relationships over time,49 the
severance of ties with a loan customer implies the loss of assets which earn quasi-rents for
banks.50 The question which then arises is this: which of these two potentially costly options will
constitute the least cost response to unanticipated capital losses?
As Calomiris and Wilson (1998) find, in the context of the Great Depression "reductions
in bank lending were the least-cost response, given the desirability of avoiding both depositor
'discipline' and the adverse selection costs of raising new equity." This finding, that the supply of
bank loans diminished following the Depression rather than demand, holds strong implications
for the functionality of the credit channel during periods of financial crisis. During the Great
Depression, for example, it seems unlikely that a large scale expansion of the monetary base
(enacted through the purchase of government debt) would have translated into a rise in the
availability of loans. Banks at that time bore significantly more risk than was desirable given the
need to limit risk for depositors. The risk of standing loans had been upwardly reassessed, and as
48
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Calomiris and Wilson (1998) finds, a shift occurred in banks' ideal portfolio allocations towards
riskless assets. This trend can be seen in the plot of the deposit-reserve ratio depicted in Figure 6
and, significantly, a similar trend is depicted in Figure 7 using data from the recent crisis. In the
case of the Great Depression, Calomiris and Wilson argue that this development led to the
widespread unavailability of bank loans. Thus – even had the balance sheets of potential
borrowers improved, or had the level of transaction deposits increased – banks would almost
certainly not have issued new loans.
The example of the Great Depression may then potentially be generalized into a theory of
"capital crunches." An implication of such a theory is that, during a period in which the riskiness
of bank assets has been upwardly reassessed (or a period in which loan losses exceed
expectations), expansionary monetary policy will fail to translate into an increased availability of
loans. This view is echoed within Meh and Moran (2009), an investigation of the role of bank
capital in propagating the subprime crisis shock. Meh and Moran (2009) develops a DSGE
model which allows for the endogenous determination of bank capital, and finds that a bank's
capital position may affects its ability to attract loanable funds. As they find, a theoretical
channel exists through which bank capital may potentially influence the business cycle.51
This theory, however, may fail to explain the lending behavior of commercial banks over
the course of recent years.52 First, a precondition for the onset of a capital crunch is that banks
face difficulty in seeking to reduce their leverage via the sale of risky assets. Because one aspect
of the Federal Reserve's response to the crisis was a program of targeted asset purchases – in
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which mortgage backed securities (MBS') and other assets whose risk had been upwardly
reassessed were removed from bank balance sheets – this condition may not have held.53 Even
more damaging to this view is the fact that, as a result of the introduction of Federal Deposit
Insurance following the Great Depression, banks may no longer face the threat of depositor
discipline. This point is emphasized by Calomiris (2009), which provides a survey of financial
crises and banking regulation within the United States, and argues that – even in the event of
significant capital losses – banks will have no incentive to deleverage and limit depositor risk.
Finally, there is a certain amount of evidence which, through the lens of casual
empiricism, would seem to indicate that a capital crunch story cannot fully explain the lending
behavior of banks throughout the Subprime crisis. Most strikingly, from the onset of the crisis
until September, 2008, western banks were able to raise some $400 bn in capital from a variety
of sources.54 Nonetheless, though large, this sum may have proved insufficient in helping banks
to delever. Further, banks' ability to raise capital may not have been uniformly distributed. As a
result, the possibility of a capital crunch is not excluded from this investigation, and a proxy for
banks' capital levels is included within the model.

B. "Credit traps" - the role of collateral values and liquidity:
The credit channel may also become impaired in the event that a "credit trap" arises. In
this case, the flow of loanable funds from banks to potential borrowers will be severed if
circumstances conspire such that banks are encouraged to hoard liquidity. This theory focuses on
a feedback loop between the strength of firms' balance sheets, the liquidity of those firms' assets,
and the dual role played by assets as collateral for bank lending. As opposed to the problem of a
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"capital crunch" – which stems from principal agent problems between banks and their creditors
– a "credit trap" may arise as a result of the asymmetric distribution of information between
banks and potential borrowers. Benmelech and Bergman (2009) describes the feedback loop
which may lead, in certain circumstances, to the onset of a credit trap. According to this
description:
"Increases in collateral values allow greater lending due to the
attendant reductions in financial frictions; Greater lending, in turn,
increases liquidity in the corporate sector; Finally, increases
incorporate liquidity serve to increase collateral values, as these are
determined in part by the ability of industry peers to purchase firm
assets."55
Benmelech and Bergman (2009) explores this feedback loop via a general equilibrium
model in which collateral values are endogenously determined. Within this framework, the
authors find three mutually exclusive types of potential equilibria. The first of these – which the
authors describe as the 'conventional equilibrium' – occurs when collateral values are high, and
allows monetary policy to successfully influence aggregate lending activity.56
The second type of equilibrium identified by Benmelech and Bergman is that of a "credit
trap." In this equilibrium, lending is constrained by prohibitively low collateral values, which
are therefore unable to mitigate the principal agent problem which occurs between banks and
potential borrowers. In order for collateral values to rise, banks will need to inject liquidity into
the corporate sector so as to increase firms' abilities to purchase the assets of other industry
participants. However, in this case, the marginal increase in collateral values which such an
injection would produce, and the associated increase in the affected firms' debt capacity, is not
sufficiently large to induce banks to lend. As a result, banks may rationally choose to hoard
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liquidity throughout the course of a monetary expansion, and regardless of the amount of
liquidity injected into credit markets by the central bank.57
Benmelech and Bergman (2009) also identify a third type of equilibrium, which they dub
the 'jumpstart' equilibrium. In this case, monetary policy can be effective, but only when the
central bank injects liquidity with sufficient force. If only a moderate amount of reserves are
distributed to banks, they will understand that making new loans will produce too small of a rise
in collateral values to justify the disbursement of funds. However, if monetary policy is eased
sufficiently, rational expectations will dictate a high lending, high collateral value outcome.58
Interestingly, this finding may provide a justification for the Federal Reserve's recent program of
quantitative easing.
Because this model implies a large role for collateral asset values, a proxy for general
asset values is included within the model. If it can be shown that asset values played a significant
role in determining bank lending throughout the Subprime crisis, this will constitute evidence for
the presence of a credit trap.

D. Regulation - binding capital-to-asset ratios:
Another theory regarding the impairment of the credit channel stems from the role of
regulation, and the changes in bank lending which capital-to-asset ratio requirements may
impose. As Peek and Rosengren (1995) describes, "a bank facing a binding capital-to-asset ratio
will be unable to expand its assets in response to an easing of monetary policy, even if loan
demand increases with the ease in policy, since it is a shortage of capital, not reserves, that is
preventing the bank from increasing its lending." Much like the theory of "capital crunches,"
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then, this view emphasizes the depletion of bank capital as a potential source of impairment to
the credit channel. As opposed to a "capital crunch," however, capital ratio requirements will not
dynamically interfere with the credit channel. Rather, the relationship between capital ratio
requirements and the credit channel will be binary in nature – either having no impact, or else
totally removing banks from credit markets as providers of new loans.
Peek and Rosengren (1995) investigates the role of capital constraints on banks'
differential reactions to monetary shocks and, in accordance with this argument, finds that capital
constrained banks are unable to contribute to the transmission of monetary policy through a
lending channel. Thus, as Peek and Rosengren argue, investigations of the impact of monetary
policy that do not allow a role for bank capital can potentially produce misleading results.59
Further, if the period in question includes a change to capital ratio requirements, that change
must somehow be taken into account.
As a result, this study allows a role for bank capital – as proxied through returns to the
BKX banking index. Though the Basel II accord has stipulated changes to capital requirements
since its original publication in 2004, those changes have yet to be properly implemented. As
such, no changes to capital ratio requirements occurred over the period investigated by this
study.
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IV. The Subprime Crisis, 2007-2009
The Subprime Crisis – otherwise known as the "Great Recession" – has featured a
disruption of financial intermediation on a scale which has not been seen since the Great
Depression.60 The crisis began in the U.S. housing market – first with a decline in housing
values, and followed by an unexpected rise in delinquency rates for subprime mortgages.
Because the boom in subprime lending was only a part of a larger credit boom – fueled by the
global savings glut and low short term interest rates, amongst other factors – the crisis soon
spread to other forms of credit. A broad range of asset markets, such as those for securitized
loans, became impaired to the point that financial institutions depending on those markets
suffered large losses on their investments. This, in turn, lead to a widespread reduction in the
availability of credit. The crisis peaked in September, 2008, when the failure (or near failure) of
many financial firms shook investor confidence and resulted in a total freeze of national financial
markets.61
In responding to the crisis, the Federal Reserve has utilized a wide array of tools. Some of
these, such as the federal funds rate, are traditional mechanisms which are relatively well
understood. Others, such as the program of Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) or
"quantitative easing," have been used in the United States for the first time. LSAPs in particular
have greatly increased the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet – and the assets which
were acquired through this program may remain there for many years to come.62
Of course, the Federal Reserve took many important steps in order to combat the effects
of the financial crisis. As the onset of the crisis became clear, the Fed moved to lower the federal
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funds rate – adopting an expansionary monetary policy as early as September, 2007.63 However,
by December, 2008, the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee (OMC) had lowered the
federal funds rate to a target range of 0 to 25 basis points – effectively reaching the zero lower
bound. Financial markets continued to flounder, and with its traditional policy tool exhausted,
the Fed was forced to consider other ways to ease its monetary policy.64
One such tool was that of communication. More specifically, and so that the reduction to
short term rates might influence the overall term structure of interest rates, the Fed issued
numerous statements indicating its long-term commitment to keeping interest rates low.65 Other
policies consisted of specially designed facilities which provided short-term liquidity assistance
to targeted institutions and markets – both financial and otherwise.66 Finally, the Federal Reserve
moved to expand its portfolio through the purchase of longer-term securities. This, the expansion
of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet through asset purchases, is the primary shock which is of
interest to this investigation.
According to a speech delivered by Ben Bernanke in 2009, the goal of the Federal
Reserve's policy response to the financial crisis was to, "stimulate aggregate demand in the
[crisis] environment, ... to reduce [credit] spreads and [to improve] the functioning of private
credit markets more generally." Since no consensus has ever emerged in regard to the
mechanisms by which monetary policy is transmitted, it is unsurprising that interest in this area
has waxed following the large scale and unprecedented expansion of the monetary base.
An interesting question which arises is this: will credit market imperfections inhibit the
transmission of monetary policy in the event that traditional mitigators of credit market
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information asymmetries – high collateral values and low-risk deposits – become significantly
impaired? Was the credit channel operational during the recent financial crisis, and if not, what
prevented it from functioning? The answers to these questions may shed light on both the role
played by credit market imperfections in the greater economy and, in turn, on how effective
monetary policy can be expected to be when the mitigators of those imperfections no longer
remain effective.

V. Data
This study examines the behavior of the Money Multiplier in relation to changes in the
monetary base – controlling for those variables which might endogenously determine both shifts
in monetary policy and prevailing credit conditions. Measurements of the money multiplier are
provided by the St. Louis branch of the Federal Reserve on a bi-weekly basis, and were collected
through the online database "FRED." I restrict the sample to measurements taken between 2001
and 2010, owing to the limited availability of data for other pertinent variables, and in order to
control for changes to banking regulation which may have caused a shift in the rules of the game
over a longer period of time. The sample contains 236 observations which are subsequently
divided into two subsamples ranging from December, 2001 to August, 2007 and from August,
2007 to December, 2010. The date break used in order to subdivide the primary sample is based
on the onset of widespread instability within U.S. financial markets.67
Records from the online database "FRED" provide measurements of both the St. Louis
Adjusted Monetary Base (M0), and M1 on a weekly basis ending Wednesday – in both
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seasonally adjusted and unadjusted forms. The series relating seasonally adjusted data for M0 is
used as a measurement of monetary policy and, following treatment described in section VIII,
serves as this study's independent variable. Data for the federal funds rate (FF), reported on a
weekly basis ending Wednesday, was also found via FRED.
The Consumer Price Index (CPI), is used as a proxy for inflation, and data for this series
was drawn from the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. This series is
reported on a monthly basis, for each month cumulatively and therefore at month's end. Because
biweekly data was not available, straight-line interpolation was used to generate intermediate
data points such that the series is compatible with the frequency of the dependent variable in a
time-series framework. The use of interpolation introduces a potential source of error into my
methodology, particularly in terms of the volatility of the CPI series. Data for the unemployment
rate was also drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as reported on a monthly basis. This
series was given a similar treatment to that of the CPI.
Expected inflation was interpreted from daily data for the yields of Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities (TIPS) and from Treasury debt of corresponding maturities. TIPS yields
were taken from Bloomberg, and data for 10-year constant maturity rate treasuries was reported
by the online database of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The spread
between these yields is taken as an indicator of inflation expectations. Week-end data was used
(ending Wednesday) rather than a moving average – avoiding the introduction of short term
noise into a series which is based in movement over the long term. This data may still be limited
by short term fluctuations which arise as a result of market forces but which are unrelated to
inflation expectations.
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The BKX banking index – a market cap weighted average of the largest 24 banks in the
United States – is taken as a measure of asset values within the financial sector, and is used in
order to investigate the possible role of bank capital in propagating a financial shock to the
greater economy. Historical data for the level of this index is widely available, and was drawn in
this case from finance.Yahoo.com. A 15-day calculation of the volatility of the BKX index is also
examined in order to investigate the potential relationship between asset value uncertainty and
aggregate trends in lending. This series was located and collected via Bloomberg. Because each
series pertaining to bank asset values is available only on days in which stock exchanges are
open, interpolation was also used in order to match the frequency of these variables with that of
the money multiplier. More specifically, and because data was not available for holidays, straight
line interpolation was used in order to calculate level values for a number of data points within
each of these series. It may also have been appropriate to include a market-cap weighted average
of bid ask spreads for the equities within this basket as a measure of bank asset liquidity.
Unfortunately, owing to time constraints, these calculations were not conducted and the model,
as it stands, lacks any measure of bank asset liquidity.
The Wilshire 5000, an index which seeks to track the values of all commonly traded
equities within the United States, is used as a proxy for common asset values within the U.S. –
assets which may be used in turn as collateral for bank lending. As in the case of the BKX index,
a 15-day calculation of the volatility of the Wilshire 5000 is also briefly examined.
The spread between LIBOR and the overnight index swap (OIS) rate (or the LIBOR-OIS
spread) is included within the model as a barometer of the general health of the financial sector.
Data for this series was collected from Bloomberg, originally at a daily frequency. This variable

44

dictates the lower bound of the period investigated, because data for the variable is only available
beginning December 12th, 2001.
US corporate BBB option-adjusted spreads – calculated as the difference between a
computed index of all bonds in the BBB rating category and a spot treasury curve – is included
within the model as a proxy for the average external finance premium (EFP) charged to BBB
rated companies. Data for this series was obtained at a bi-weekly frequency, ending Wednesday,
and was found through the FRED database as a publication of Bank of America Merrill Lynch.
Ideally, including a greater number of variables in the VAR model would lead to a more
detailed picture of credit market functionality over the period in question. However, given the
exponential nature of growth in the number of coefficients which must be estimated should an
additional variable be included, this is not the case. The primary limitation of the data is its low
degrees of freedom – even independent of the statistical model employed. Only 236 observations
are divided into two smaller periods, which means that the VAR estimated for each will include
even fewer degrees of freedom than if calculated using the already limited cumulative data set.
Because of this, variables were included within each VARs assessed only when absolutely
necessary.

VI. Methodology
Boivin and Giannoni (2002) applies a VAR framework to model the relationships
between economic variables and monetary policy, and in order to assess whether there was a
change in the transmission of monetary policy over the course of the 20th century. My study
adopts a similar methodology in order to investigate a potential change in the transmission
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mechanism during the recent period of financial crisis. Within their study, Boivin and Giannoni
employ a data set spanning from 1960 to 2001, and which includes only four variables:
detrended output, the inflation rate, commodity price inflation, and the federal funds rate. First,
an initial VAR is calculated using the entire data set in order to test for parameter instability. In
this case, evidence for parameter instability is found. Next, VARs are estimated for two smaller
samples – such that more specific details of the change in monetary transmission can be
extracted from the data. Four lags were included in each of the VARs estimated, and data
transformations were performed (first differences, high pass filter, lags) in order to correct for
various issues.
The test of stability which Boivin and Giannoni employ is the Quandt-Andrews test for
an unknown date break, or the 'Wald version' of the Quandt (1960) likelihood-ratio test. Though
the Quandt-Andrews test successfully isolates a number of potential date-breaks for use in their
study, Boivin and Giannoni use that output only as evidence for general parameter instability –
and instead elect to base the break-date for their benchmark comparison on anecdotal evidence.
This, they argue, a more consistent picture of the timing of observed instability.
Following many papers in the literature, Boivin and Giannoni choose to adhere to the
"recursiveness" assumption – or that the policy variable affects non policy variables only with a
lag of one period (in this case one quarter). The policy variable, however, is allowed to respond
contemporaneously to all other variables. Once estimated, the variance decompositions and
impulse responses for each VAR were compared in order to assess the nature of the shift in the
transmission mechanism.
My hypothesis is that, similar to the changes identified in Boivin and Giannoni (2002),
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy has undergone a significant shift between the

46

pre-crisis and crisis periods. Much like Boivin and Giannoni, parameter instability tests are
conducted in the context of a VAR estimated using data from both periods cumulatively. The
recursiveness assumption is retained, and three lags are included within each VAR. Data
transformations (first differences, lags) are used in order to address issues of stationarity. In its
final form, each series satisfies an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity with a rejection
of the null hypothesis at the 99.5% significance level or higher. Once estimated, variance
decompositions and impulse responses are analyzed in order to address questions regarding the
operation of the credit channel.
Because VAR models estimated using this data set are limited by lost degrees of freedom,
normal time series regressions were also conducted. While these fail to render the dynamic
response of the money multiplier to innovations in various economic variables, the use of a crisis
dummy variable allows for the investigation of a change in relationship over the pre-crisis and
crisis periods between the multiplier and a given variable.
My analysis of the transmission mechanism uses two sample periods: from December,
2001 to August, 2007 and from August, 2007 to December, 2010. As are discussed later, the
results from a Quandt-Andrews unknown date break test and two Chow known date break tests
can be found in Tables 4 and 5 of the appendix, respectively.
Monetary policy innovations were isolated via autoregression of the M0 series against
three lags. Residuals were taken from this regression, and are employed as a measure of
monetary shocks.
Because movement in the Wilshire 5000 (W5000) reflects returns to the BKX banking
index, a similar approach was applied to adjust data for this series. More specifically, movement
in the Wilshire 5000 was regressed against returns to the BKX banking index – such that the
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residuals from this regression measure movement in the W5000 holding returns to the BKX
index static. These values were then used in the estimation of both VAR and time series models.

VII. Results
A. Vector Autoregression Analysis
A.i Parameter instability
In order to test for parameter instability between the crisis and pre-crisis periods, I first
estimate a reduced-form recursive VAR for the overall data set – including only changes in the
money multiplier (MM), the federal funds rate (Ffrate), returns to the BKX banking index
(rBKX), and the change in the monetary base (M0) as variables. Using the equation in which
MM is the dependent variable, I then perform a Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test. The
result of this test can be found in Table 4 of the appendix, and shows that, based on the
maximization of the Wald F-test for all potential date breaks considered, January 30th, 2008 is
statistically the most probable location for a breakpoint within the time frame in question (Fstatistic 110.4939, P<0.01). However, while this finding indicates that January 30th, 2008 is a
potentially valid break date, it is also taken as evidence for general parameter instability, and the
majority of the testing conducted within this investigation is based on a date break of August 1,
2007.
The decision to use this date break in place of Sept. 10, 2008 is made based on a
significant increase in the LIBOR-OIS spread which occurred during throughout the month of
August, 2007. More specifically, the LIBOR-OIS rose a dramatic 53.2% between July 18th and
August 1st, and 383.6% between August 1st and August 15th. This rise in the LIBOR-OIS
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spread implies that a breakdown of interbank lending occurred at that time – one of the first real
symptoms of the interruption of financial intermediation which occurred in the United States
over the course of the Great Recession.
Given this information, Chow tests for a known breakpoint were conducted for both
January 30, 2008 and August 1, 2007, using the equation for MM referenced above. The Chow
test for the August 1, 2007 fails to reject the null hypothesis of parameter continuity (P> 0.65).
The results of both tests can be seen in Table 5 of the appendix. Nonetheless, an argument for
using August 1, 2007 can still be made. The shifts which occurred in the LIBOR-OIS spread
during the month of August 2007 marked the first symptoms of the coming financial crisis. Thus,
the time period following this date, but before January 30, 2008 should not be viewed as part of
the "pre-crisis period." Of course, tests might be conducted using three periods; however, owing
to the limited size of the data set, this approach would be impractical. As such, for the
subsequent testing described within this paper, April 1, 2007 is assumed to mark the onset of
financial crisis within both the VAR model and time series regressions estimated.

A.ii Granger causality tests
In addition to Quandt-Andrews and Chow tests for parameter instability, a comparison of
Granger causality tests conducted for the crisis and pre-crisis periods may also serve to
demonstrate a shift in the relationship between each of the variables in question. Results for
pairwise Granger causality tests pairing each variable with the money multiplier can be found in
Table 6 of the appendix. Whereas the federal funds rate, CPI, expected inflation, the LIBOR-OIS
spread, the external finance premium, returns to the BKX banking index, the 15 day volatility
for the W5000 and changes in M0 are collectively not found to Granger cause movement in the
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money multiplier during the period preceding the crisis, each is found to Granger cause
movement in the multiplier during the crisis at the 90% probability level or above. Together,
these findings may indicate that a shift in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
occurred between the crisis and pre-crisis periods. In addition to this collective implication, each
of these findings is individually significant.
Though pairwise Granger causality tests do not yield a sign for the relationship between
variables, that the federal funds rate, CPI and expected inflation are all better predictors of MM
during the crisis implies that the interest rate channel operated more strongly during this period.
Of these, only the federal funds rate might have had an impact on the denominator of the
multiplier (via the open market operations through which target rates are achieved). Otherwise,
the effect of each of these variables on the money multiplier must have been felt through the
multiplier's numerator – in other words through aggregate lending. Because the federal funds rate,
the CPI and expected inflation all have an impact on the real level of interest rates – as well as on
the term structure of real interest rates – it may be reasonable to infer that the impact of these
variables on the multiplier is felt through neoclassical channels. In order to confirm this
conclusion, however, further investigation is necessary regarding the nature of the relationships
between each of these variables and the multiplier.
A separate finding relates to the relationship between movement in the monetary base
and change in the multiplier. While M0 did not Granger cause movement in the multiplier during
the period preceding the crisis, M0 was found to Granger cause movement in MM within the
crisis period. This is consistent with the expected relationship between M0 and the multiplier
which is suggested by the credit view, in which an expansion of M0 will lead to a reduction in
the external finance premium, an outward shift in the supply of loans, and a rise in both lending
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and in output. Because the money multiplier is defined as the ration between M1 and M0, M0
will only have a neutral impact on the multiplier in the event that movement in M0 is matched by
movement in M1. Within the sample period, movement in the latter variable is driven largely by
bank lending behavior (since the currency ratio is fairly static). This finding indicates then that
movement in M0 led to a shift in lending during the period preceding the crisis, but did not
during the crisis itself. Of course, Granger causality tests do not control for the movement in
other variables, and as such the change in interest rates which movement in M0 precipitates
could be responsible for the pre-crisis period result. Similarly, lending may be impacted by a
wide range of other economic variables. As such, while suggestive of a credit channel, this
finding may only be viewed as very limited evidence.
Similarly, that M0 predicts movement in MM during the crisis is consistent with but does
not demonstrate that the operation of credit channel was in some way changed. This could have
occurred in only one of two ways – either M0 became positively or negatively correlated with
movement in MM. If movement in M0 was found to have related positively to movement in MM,
this would suggest that the operation of the credit channel had become enhanced. If M0 is
negatively related to MM, however, this suggests that the credit channel became impaired.
Alternatively, of course, change in a third, omitted variable which causes movement in both M0
and the multiplier may have led to the appearance of either a negative or positive correlation, but
which implies nothing about the credit channel. This criticism may be refitted for any
interpretation of Granger causality tests in general. Nonetheless, and though Granger causality
tests do not indicate the nature of a given relationship, this finding does indicate that a change of
some kind occurred. The nature of that change will be taken up later, in light of further evidence.
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The finding that returns to the BKX banking index (rBKX) Granger caused movements
in the multiplier during, but not preceding the crisis also holds implications. More specifically,
this suggests that bank capital played a larger role in determining lending behavior during the
crisis than before it – though, in the context of Granger causality tests, (in which no sign is
rendered), the nature of that role ultimately remains ambiguous. In light of the finding that M0
Granger causes the multiplier during the crisis, it may be tempting to see the similarly enhanced
role for rBKX during the crisis as evidence for a capital crunch. However, as is discussed later,
results from time series regressions cast doubt on this interpretation.
Finally, it is interesting to note that returns to the W5000 index were found to Granger
cause movement in the multiplier both during and preceding the crisis. This implies a significant
role for collateral values in determining lending behavior throughout the period investigated –
which is in turn consistent with the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission. It is also
important to note that, if returns to the W5000 index were not found to Granger cause movement
in MM during the crisis, this result would constitute compelling evidence against the existence of
a credit trap. Because this was not found, the hypothesis that a credit trap occurred cannot be
rejected without further investigation.
Granger causality tests were also conducted using the date break of January 30, 2008, in
order to test for a large difference in results. If a large difference were found, a strong argument
could be made for conducting further tests using both date breaks as well – and in fact, given an
unlimited amount of time, this would be desirable regardless. As can be seen in Table 6, however,
the results using this date break are largely consistent with those derived from the date break of
August 1st, 2007. As opposed to those results, the second Granger estimations show that MM
causes rw5000resid in Panel 2, MM does not cause CPI in Panel 1, MM causes Expin in Panel 1,
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and rw5000resid does not cause MM in Panel 2. Findings for every other test remained the same.
Of these differences, the last is the most interesting. As opposed to the results generated using
the August 1st date break, this result more strongly supports a differential role played by
collateral values in determining lending between the non-crisis and crisis periods.

A.iii Impulse response and variance decomposition
As previously discussed, one limitation of VAR analysis in the context of this data set is
the limited degrees of freedom which may be retained as additional variables are included.
Observations for the data set are collected at a bi-weekly frequency, and within a time frame
which spans less than a decade. As a result, the estimated VARs are limited to the inclusion of a
maximum of five variables. The exclusion of other series – which are known from economic
theory to relate to lending behavior and therefore the money multiplier – implies that the VAR
systems estimated will necessarily present a limited picture of the determinants of the multiplier.
Two VARs were estimated, using different sets of variables. The first, VAR(1), includes
the Money Multiplier (MM), the federal funds rate (Ffrate), the LIBOR-OIS spread
(LiborOisSpread), returns to the BKX banking index (rBKX), and changes in the monetary base
(M0). The variance decompositions for VAR(1) Panel 1 and VAR(1) Panel 2 can be found in the
appendix, in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. The Impulse responses generated for VAR(1)
Panel 1 and VAR(1) Panel 2 can also be found in the appendix, in Figure 10 and Figure 11.
Unfortunately, the majority of the impulse responses generated for VAR(1) yield few
significant results – primarily owing to the width of error bands. One significant result, however,
is found in the impulse response of M0 to an innovation in MM, as drawn from VAR(1) Panel 1.
As the graph of this impulse response shows, a one percentage point innovation in MM leads to a
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2 percent fall in M0 which persists for a period of two weeks. Inversely, then, a fall in the
multiplier can be said to lead to a rise in M0. This may imply that the Federal Reserve has
adopted what might be described as a "fire fighting" approach over the course of the recent
decade. In other words, and if the Fed did follow such an approach, as lending fell as a result of
movement in real economic variables, the Fed would then expand the monetary base in order to
stimulate lending and as a measure to combat that trend. That the impulse response of M0 to a
rise in MM is even stronger within Panel 2 (the crisis period) may also support this view.
Similarly, and as can be seen in Table 6, it was found that (as opposed to change in M0 Granger
causing movement in EFP) change in the EFP Granger caused changes in M0.
The next VAR which was estimated, VAR(2), includes the Money Multiplier, the federal
funds rate, returns to the BKX banking index, returns to the W5000 index (rw5000resid), and
changes in the monetary base. The variance decompositions for VAR(2) Panel 1 and VAR(2)
Panel 2 can be found in the appendix, in Table 9 and Table 10, respectively. The Impulse
responses generated for VAR(2) Panel 1 and VAR(2) Panel 2 can also be found in the appendix,
in Figure 11 and Figure 12.
The impulse responses which VAR(2) generate are of a similar mint – again, findings are
largely limited by the small number of variables which may be included, and by wide standard
error bands resulting from limited data. Unlike VAR(1), however, the impulse responses for
VAR(2) do indicate a marginally significant role for rBKX and rw5000resid in determining
movement in MM. In Panel 1, an innovation in rBKX leads to a rise in MM following a lag of 3
weeks, but which quickly returns to zero. This finding is consistent with the view that bank
capital, in part, determines the lending behavior of banks. Next, an innovation in rw5000resid
leads to a similar response – a rise in MM following a lag of 3 weeks. This indicates that, as for
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bank capital, collateral values may play a role in determining lending behavior. In Panel 2, the
impulse response of rBKX shifts. MM reacts negatively to an innovation in this series, but only
following a lag of 7 weeks and which returns to zero by week 8. The short lived and lagged
nature of this response may indicate that this finding is merely a statistical blip. Unlike rBKX,
the impulse response of MM to an innovation in rw5000resid in Panel 2 is largely similar to that
in Panel 1. MM responds positively to an innovation in rw5000resid following a lag of 3 weeks,
returning to zero by week four. Findings for the relationship between rw5000resid and MM are
larger and more significant than those for rBKX. Thus, while the short lived and marginally
significant findings for rBKX are likely spurious, a stronger argument can be made for change in
the value of collateral as a determinant of bank lending.
Another interesting finding which may be drawn from VAR(2) pertains to the impulse
responses of MM to an innovation in M0 – as compared between Panels 1 and 2. In Panel 1, an
innovation in M0 leads to a small, marginally significant negative reaction in MM following a
lag of three weeks. By week four, this response has fallen to zero. In Panel 2, the same
innovation leads to no significant response in the multiplier at all. Interestingly, and in
contradiction to other evidence found within this investigation, this finding indicates that the
credit channel did not function during the period preceding the crisis, but did function during the
crisis itself. However, because the response of MM to an innovation in M0 within Panel 1 (the
non-crisis period) is both small and short lived, it is plausible that this result is merely an artifact
of the VAR's order and specification.
Overall, while a VAR framework may be appropriate for investigation of the credit
channel over a longer period or with data of a higher frequency, it may ultimately be poorly
suited to an examination of the given data set. Because the results produced through the
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estimation of VARs are largely insignificant, traditional time series regressions were also
employed in addition to these models.

B. Time Series Analysis
The time series regressions estimated within this investigation each employ the money
multiplier (MM) as the dependent variable. Varying by regression, a combination of the federal
funds rate, the LIBOR-OIS spread, returns to the BKX banking index, returns to the W5000
index, changes in the monetary base, a crisis dummy variable, and interactions between the crisis
dummy and other series are included on the RHS.
The specification of regressions two and three of Table 3 within the appendix was
conducted in two steps. 68 First, each variable was tested for an optimum number of lags based
on minimization of the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC and BIC, respectively).
When the marginal inclusion of a lag produced a lower AIC value but a higher value for the BIC,
a comparison of values for either regression's adjusted R2 was used as the final deciding factor.
The result of this process can be found in regression two of Table 3, which includes three lags
for the federal funds rate, five lags for returns to the BKX banking index, and one lag for returns
to the W5000 index. This methodology was not applied in determining the number of lags
included for autoregression of the money multiplier, or for changes in the monetary base.69 In
these cases, the insignificance of the coefficients estimated for lagged values of these variables is
also highly illustrative – and as a result, three lags are used for both. Because this model was not
68

Because coefficients relating the LIBOR-OIS spread to movement in the Money Multiplier were insignificant in
every variation of the regression, this variable was not included within regressions two or three of Table 3 within the
appendix.
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While this methodology was not used to determine the number of lags included, tests for an "ideal" number of
lags were nevertheless conducted. Based on that process, a model optimized for the purpose of forecasting
movement in the money multiplier should include only one lagged value for changes in M0, and no lagged values of
the multiplier.
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intended for use in forecasting – but rather to test for the existence of and change in relationships
over time – a reduction in the model's accuracy stemming from the inclusion of these lags is
largely an irrelevant phenomenon.
Once the optimum number of lags for each variable was identified, a series of
interactions between those variable and the crisis dummy were conducted in order to test for a
change in the relationship between a given variable and the multiplier during the crisis period.
Interactions were conducted individually, such that no two variables were interacted with the
crisis dummy within a single regression. Further, for any given test the original lagged terms of
the variable were retained within the regression in their original form – copies of those terms
were added for the purpose of interaction. Thus, the test for a change in relationship between
rBKX and the multiplier includes the original five lagged terms for the variable (as determined
during lag specification) and a copy of those terms interacted with the dummy variable.
The results from these tests indicate that returns to both the BKX banking and W5000
indices can more significantly explain variation in the money multiplier in the context of the
crisis period. When either variable was interacted with the crisis dummy, it was found that the
coefficients for the interacted terms were significant, while the coefficients estimated either
variable's original terms no longer explained MM. Regressions were then estimated including
the interacted terms in the absence of the originals – and AIC and BIC values from these
regressions were compared to those of the base specification. In both cases, this comparison
indicates that the interacted variables contribute more significantly to explaining movement in
the multiplier.
That lagged values of rBKX can better explain movement in the multiplier when
interacted with the crisis dummy has important implications – though multiple valid
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interpretations of this finding may exist. First, and because larger movements occurs in the rBKX
series during the crisis period than in the period preceding it, this result may indicate a non-linear
relationship between rBKX and the multiplier.70 Alternatively, this finding may indicate that, as
this investigation has hypothesized, the relationship between rBKX and change in the money
multiplier shifted with the onset of the crisis. Ultimately, and without further investigation, it is
impossible to definitively state whether one or both of these interpretations is valid.
Regardless of which of these is true, this finding holds further notable implications.
Because returns to the BKX index serve as a proxy for changes in the level of bank capital, this
result suggests that bank capital played a more significant role in determining lending behavior
during the crisis than it did in the period preceding it.71 This finding is consistent with the
literature regarding a "capital crunch," which implies that bank capital will affect lending to a
higher degree when capital has become depleted – and as was the case during the crisis period.72
However, upsetting this interpretation, the cumulative sign of the five lags for rBKX which are
included in the model is estimated to be negative. As can be seen from the results reported for
regression three, (found in Table 3), a positive shift in returns to the BKX banking index predicts
an overall fall in change to the money multiplier over time – contradicting the view that reduced
bank capital led to a capital crunch during the recent financial crisis.
The finding that returns to the W5000 index better predict movement in the multiplier
when interacted with the crisis dummy also holds important implications – some of which echo
those regarding returns to the BKX index. First, as for rBKX, this finding implies either a shift in

70

This could be investigated through a more exhaustive specification search. No such search is conducted here
owing to time limitations.
71
This is true whether rBKX is non-linearly related to movement in MM, (in which case the larger movement in
rBKX would lead to a disproportionately larger impact on the multiplier), or if a change in the relationship between
these variables occurred with the onset of the crisis.
72
Calomiris and Wilson (1998).
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the relationship between these variables, or that returns to the W5000 are nonlinearly related to
movement in the money multiplier. As before, it is impossible to identify the correct
interpretation of this finding without further investigation.
Regardless, that returns to the W5000 more significantly explain movement in MM when
interacted with the crisis dummy implies that collateral values played a larger role in
determining lending behavior during the crisis period. Importantly, the sign found for this
relationship is positive – which provides evidence for the existence of a balance sheet channel of
monetary transmission during the recent financial crisis. So too is this evidence consistent with
the view that a "credit trap" may have occurred, resulting in liquidity hoarding and the
interruption of financial intermediation. However, while such interpretations are compelling, so
too must they be viewed with a certain degree of skepticism. It may be the case that movement in
economic variables not included within this model caused changes in both returns to the W5000
index and to aggregate lending behavior simultaneously.
A final conclusion which may be drawn from these regressions relates to the relationship
between M0 and movement in the multiplier. As can be seen in Table 3, M0 was only found to
significantly predict movement in the money multiplier only in regression 3, when interacted
with the crisis dummy. That movement in M0 significantly predicts a negative movement in MM
during the crisis but is insignificant during the period preceding is consistent with the hypothesis
that operation of the credit channel was relatively impaired throughout the crisis.
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VIII. Conclusion
The results show mixed evidence regarding the relationship between movement in the
monetary base and change in the money multiplier over time. Granger causality tests indicate
that movement in M0 does not explain change in the multiplier for the period preceding the crisis,
but does explain movement in MM during the crisis. Conversely, VAR impulse responses for a
one percentage point innovation in M0 are found to have a weakly significant (negative) impact
on movement of the multiplier during the non crisis period, and no impact during the crisis itself.
Finally, time series regressions show that M0 only becomes significantly related to movement in
MM when interacted with a crisis dummy. Cumulatively, and because findings from the VAR
may represent an artifact of the VAR's specification, these results are consistent with the
hypothesis that the credit channel was relatively impaired during the recent financial crisis as
compared to the period which preceded it.
So too is the relationship between returns to the W5000 index and movement in the
multiplier consistent with this interpretation. Based on the theory of the balance sheet channel,
we would predict that this relationship would grow stronger during the financial crisis – during
which, balance sheets became significantly weakened. This is, in fact, what is found. While
Granger causality tests indicate that this variable significantly explains movement in MM both
during the crisis and preceding it – as is also indicated by VAR impulse responses – results from
time series regressions imply a greater role for this variable in explaining movement in MM
during the crisis period. This notion is further supported by the fact that when Granger causality
tests are conducted using the date break of January 30, 2008 – as suggested by the results of a
Quandt-Andrews unknown date break test – returns to the W5000 index are found to Granger
cause movement in the multiplier only during the crisis period.
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In turn, these finding supports the notion that a "credit trap" may have led to the
interruption of financial intermediation throughout the course of the Great Recession.
Corroborating this view, results from the time series regression of returns to the BKX banking
index against changes in the multiplier indicate that the theory of a "capital crunch" provides a
poor explanation for the widespread reduction in lending. Because the introduction of Federal
Deposit Insurance in the wake of the Great Depression removed the threat of depositor discipline
formerly faced by banks, this result is unsurprising.
Evidence is found for the operation of a credit channel during the non-crisis period, and
for impairment of that channel during the recent financial crisis. Together, these findings indicate
that credit market imperfections play a significant role in determining the impact of monetary
policy on the economy. Further, this study implies that when collateral values are low, they may
fail to mitigate problems of asymmetric information which occur between borrowers and banks.
As a result, an expansionary monetary policy can be expected to have a reduced impact on bank
lending when asset values are low.
Though the findings of this study are largely consistent with the theoretical literature, so
too must their limitations be acknowledged. Since the linkages between economic variables are
complex and interrelated, results from the estimated time series regressions suffer both from a
likely omitted variable bias and from a failure to recognize the dynamic responses of
macroeconomic variables to monetary policy innovations. Many important economic variables
were not included within this model, and unlike results taken from VAR analysis, basic time
series regressions do not imply a dynamic impulse response. Further, returns to the W5000 and
BKX banking indices may serve as only noisy indicators of the variables for which they are
intended to proxy – bank capital and the value of collateral assets. So too are the VAR models
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developed here limited by these issues – as well as by the sample size employed and the
exponential nature of estimations which must be conducted as additional variables are included.
Though beyond the scope of this investigation, the use of recently developed econometric
techniques may allow for these issues to be addressed. Bernanke, et al. (2005) describes the
Factor Augmented Vector Autoregression model, or FAVAR, which allows for the inclusion of a
wider set of economic variables without the loss of significance which occurs within a traditional
VAR. Further research into the issues addressed within this investigation might employ this
newly developed approach, rendering more accurate results for the dynamic responses of
movement in the money multiplier to innovations in economic variables.
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Appendix
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Series
∆MM
M0
∆FF rate
∆10yr T
∆CPI
∆E(π)
∆Unem.
∆LIBOR-OIS spread
R[BKX]
∆BKX σ(15D)
R[W5000]
∆W5000 σ(15D)
∆EFP

Median

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Standard
Deviation

0.06
-0.06
0.00
-0.45
0.10
-0.06
0.00
0.00
0.05
-3.11
0.25
14.82
-0.43

-0.31
0.05
-2.50
-0.29
0.09
1.19
0.24
4.09
-0.38
4.96
0.03
18.28
0.13

-18.84
-13.76
-226.67
-26.59
-0.92
-50.82
-2.17
-82.65
-39.19
-52.42
-8.03
5.44
-19.51

11.94
10.83
47.37
17.34
0.68
218.84
5.10
383.56
22.23
186.03
8.09
86.23
27.12

2.62
2.12
23.22
4.97
0.17
17.60
1.30
39.22
6.02
36.37
2.09
12.43
6.13
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Table 2: Correlation Matrices
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Table 3: ADL Time Series Regressions
Dependent Variable = Growth in the money multiplier (MM)
(1)
0.0778
(0.268)

(2)
0.0021
(0.008)

(3)
-0.0094
(-0.044)

MM (-4)

0.1465
(0.690)

0.2251
(1.131)

0.2112
(-1.404)

MM (-6)

-0.0420
(-0.253)

-0.1002
(-0.701)

-0.0857
(-0.666)

Ffrate (-2)

-0.0091
(-0.600)

-0.0111
(-0.885)

-0.0136
(-1.188)

Ffrate (-4)

0.0003
(0.020)

0.0044
(0.321)

0.0084
(0.626)

Ffrate (-6)

0.0157**
(1.977)

0.0284***
(2.848)

0.0358***
(3.163)

LiborOisSpread (-2)

-0.0015
(-0.267)

LiborOisSpread (-4)

-0.0029
(-1.137)

LiborOisSpread (-6)

-0.0014
(-0.775)

MM (-2)

rBKX (-2)

-0.0711**
(-2.056)

-0.0827**
(-2.405)

rBKX (-4)

-0.0074
(-0.208)

-0.0159
(-0.435)

rBKX (-6)

-0.0633
(-1.391)

-0.0643
(-1.519)

rBKX (-8)

-0.0770*
(-1.914)

rBKX (-10)

0.0734*
(1.769)

rBKX (-2) * Crisis

-0.0895**
(-2.393)

rBKX (-4) * Crisis

-0.0146

(-0.341)
rBKX (-6) * Crisis

-0.0718
(-1.382)

rBKX (-8) * Crisis

-0.1065**
(-2.148)

rBKX (-10) * Crisis

0.0978**
(2.061)

rw5000resid (-2)

0.3342**
(2.808)

rw5000resid (-4)

-0.0605
(-0.611)

rw5000resid (-6)

0.0291
(0.324)

0.3455***
(3.348)

rw5000resid (-2) x Crisis

0.4390***
(3.286)

M0 (-2)

-0.4627
(-1.305)

-0.5327
(-1.546)

M0 (-4)

-0.1315
(-0.603)

-0.1296
(-0.679)

M0 (-6)

0.0756
(0.370)

0.0838
(0.493)

M0 (-2) * Crisis

-0.5692*
(-1.733)

M0 (-4) * Crisis

-0.1634
(-0.877)

M0 (-6) * Crisis

0.1310
(0.762)

Crisis dummy variable

-0.5573
(-1.552)

-0.5146
(-1.594)

-0.4992
(-1.526)

Intercept

-0.0364
(-0.330)

-0.0689
(-0.603)

-0.0677
(-0.826)

Notes: T-stat is in parentheses; Heterosketastic Robust Standard Errors used; *denotes significance at
the 90% level; ** denotes significance at the 95% level; *** denotes significance at the 99% level.

Table 4: Quandt-Andrews Unknown Breakpoint Test

Table 5: Chow Breakpoint Tests
April 1, 2007:

January 30, 2008

Table 6: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
August 1st, 2007 date break

Table 6 (Continued): Granger Causality Tests
January 30th, 2008 date break

Table 7: Variance decompositions VAR(1) Panel 1

Table 8: Variance decompositions VAR(1) Panel 2

Table 9: Variance decompositions VAR(2) Panel 1

Table 10: Variance decompositions VAR(2) Panel 2

Figure 9: Growth Rate of the Deposit-Currency Ratio (1919-1941)

Figure 10: Impulse responses for VAR(1) Panel 1
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses for VAR(1) Panel 2
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Figure 12: Impulse responses for VAR(2) Panel 1
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innov ations ± 2 S.E.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses for VAR(2) Panel
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innov ations ± 2 S.E.
Response of MM to MM

Response of MM to FFRATE

Response of MM to RBKX

Response of MM to RW5000RESID

Response of MM to M0

4

4

4

4

4

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

-2

-2
2

4

6

8

10

-2
2

Response of FFRATE to MM

4

6

8

10

-2
2

Response of FFRATE to FFRATE

4

6

8

10

Response of FFRATE to RBKX

-2
2

4

6

8

10

2

Response of FFRATE to RW5000RESID

40

40

40

40

40

20

20

20

20

20

0

0

0

0

0

-20

-20

-20

-20

-20

-40

-40

-40

-40

2

4

6

8

10

2

Response of RBKX to MM

4

6

8

10

2

Response of RBKX to FFRATE

4

6

8

10

4

6

8

10

2

Response of RBKX to RW5000RESID

12

12

12

12

8

8

8

8

8

4

4

4

4

4

0

0

0

0

0

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

2

4

6

8

10

2

4

6

8

10

2

Response of RW5000RESID to FFRATE

4

6

8

10

Response of RW5000RESID to RBKX

2

4

6

8

10

2

Response of RW5000RESID to RW5000RESID

4

4

4

4

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

-2
2

4

6

8

10

-2
2

Response of M0 to MM

4

6

8

10

-2
2

Response of M0 to FFRATE

4

6

8

10

4

6

8

10

2

Response of M0 to RW5000RESID

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

-2

-2

-2

-2

-2

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-4

-4

-4

-4

4

6

8

10

2

4

6

8

10

2

4

6

8

10

6

8

10

4

6

8

10

4

6

8

10

Response of M0 to M0

2

2

4

-2
2

Response of M0 to RBKX

10

Response of RW5000RESID to M0

4

-2

8

Response of RBKX to M0

12

Response of RW5000RESID to MM

6

-40
2

Response of RBKX to RBKX

4

Response of FFRATE to M0

-4
2

4

6

8

10

2

4

6

8

10

